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For many years with three different supreme leaders of the Democratic Republic of 
North Korea (DPRK), United States Government (USG) efforts to deter, limit, minimize, 
and abolish DPRK nuclear weapons development and production have all failed (1).  
One might attribute failure to an inadequate rationale for allowing some governments 
but not others to develop and produce such weapons; inadequate USG intelligence 
collection, intelligence analysis, clandestine and covert intelligence operations, and 
counterintelligence capabilities; inadequate USG will to employ suitable intelligence and 
military capabilities; or a nonpartisan inadequacy in developing and implementing 
national security policy. 
But there’s a core psychological issue behind the failure as well.  Many years of operant 
conditioning research suggest only 4 main approaches to influencing any behavior (2).  
In positive reinforcement one introduces a consequence—something experienced as 
pleasurable—after a desired behavior that has the effect of increasing the probability 
that the behavior will occur again.  In negative reinforcement one introduces a 
consequence after a desired behavior that has the effect of decreasing something 
experienced as noxious by the behavior’s perpetrator.  This will have the effect of as 
well of increasing the probability that the behavior will occur again.  In omission training 
one introduces a consequence—removing something experienced as positive—after an 
undesired behavior that has the effect of decreasing the probability the behavior will 
occur again.  And in punishment one introduces a consequence experienced as noxious 
after an undesired behavior to decrease the probability of that behavior. 
National security policy, thus, can be rescued by psychological research, and decision 
makers can then go on to engage the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.  But there are 
just a few nagging problems.  First, there’s a circularity to the 4 main approaches 
influencing behavior.  Looking a priori for what will increase or decrease the probability 
of a behavior a posteriori, when the likely candidates are those with an a posteriori not 
an a priori track record, presumes different situations are the same, or similar enough.  
This is the key vulnerability of inductive logic—coming up with a universal conclusion 
based on finite, specific examples—that founds much of science, including 
psychological science.  Second, what is experienced as desired or undesired, 
pleasurable or noxious, even meaningful or without substantive meaning, is often 
enough not easy to identify for operant conditioners and their targets.  Even if 
identification were easy at one moment, matters change with time.  This is the case for 
initiators, targets, and observers of national security initiatives.  Third, there are 
problematics with predictability, punishment being the most researched example.  Yes, 
punishment-related learning may result in a lower probability of a specific behavior.  
Punishment also may alternatively result in the target learning how better to hide 
undesired behaviors.  The target also may learn how to apply noxious consequences to 
others with less power or even those with more power, if the target has nothing but the 
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undesired behavior in its behavioral repertoire.  And it turns out that punishment along 
with negative reinforcement and omission training are difficult to apply consistently, with 
the right timing, over extended periods of time.  In addition, all 3 may lead to the target 
picking up mixed messages, depending on what else the target perceives is happening 
domestically, regionally, and globally at the hands of various others. 
So although the nucleus of the atom has been split, the psychological nucleus of 
denuclearization has proven too tough a nut to crack. Similar problems occur with the 
two other most other common approaches to conditioning—classical conditioning and 
vicarious conditioning (3).  As with more sophisticated variants of behavioral economics, 
approaches acknowledging the significant roles played by the irrational, illogical, and 
the emotional in human nature may prove more successful.  Some would say that the 
negative attributes rightly or wrongly ascribed to the current leaders of the USG and the 
DPRK may fit the bill.         
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